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Abstract
All societies face the need to make judgments about what interventions (both public health and personal 
medical) to provide to their populations under reasonable resource constraints. Their decisions should be 
informed by good evidence and arguments from health technology assessment (HTA). But if HTA restricts 
itself to evaluations of safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness, it risks being viewed as insufficient to guide health 
decision-makers; if it addresses other issues, such as budget impact, equity, and financial protection, it may be 
accused of overreaching. But the risk of overreaching can be reduced by embedding HTA in a fair, deliberative 
process that meets the conditions required by accountability for reasonableness.
Keywords: Health Technology Assessment (HTA), Accountability for Reasonableness, Safety, Efficacy, Cost-
effectiveness, Equity, Financial Protection, Budget Impact, Fairness, Legitimacy. 
Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Daniels N, Porteny T, Urritia J. Expanded HTA: enhancing fairness and legitimacy. Int J Health Policy 
Manag. 2016;5(1):1–3. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.187
*Correspondence to:
Norman Daniels
Email: ndaniels@hsph.harvard.edu
Article History:
Received: 14 August 2015
Accepted: 12 October 2015
ePublished: 6 November 2015
     Editorial
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2016, 5(1), 1–3 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.187
All societies must make choices among the various interventions, whether public health or medical care, that they can provide to their members since 
reasonable resource limits on health expenditures mean 
not all health protections can be provided to everyone.1 
However, important health is, it is not the only important 
good that societies must provide, and so there are always 
reasonable ways to limit what can be done to protect health. 
For these choices to be justifiable to the public they affect, 
they ought to be made in light of good evidence and sound 
rationales. One source of good evidence is provided by 
health technology assessment (HTA). Historically, HTA has 
focused on the safety and efficacy of an intervention, but also 
the cost-effectiveness of an intervention,2 though there is an 
increasing awareness that a broader form of HTA is needed3 
and some limited, effort is already being made in a few 
countries to meet that need, most HTA reports even in those 
countries fail to develop ethical arguments and generally do 
not even mention ethical issues.4 One important advantage 
of focusing on safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness is that 
these aspects of an intervention can be evaluated with highly 
quantifiable methods that are replicable and serve to compare 
interventions.5
Decision-makers must, however, decide to provide 
interventions on the basis of additional considerations. They 
generally need to know what the budget impact of coverage 
is likely to be for society and what are its opportunity costs. 
For example, providing coverage for pharmacological therapy 
of chronic hepatitis C infection can save many lives, but if 
there are many instances of such a condition, a society may 
not sustainably cover the service for everyone. Covering it 
for some and not others poses difficult ethical issues and may 
prove to violate concerns about equitable treatment. Decision-
makers also need to know what the degree of financial 
protection is—for though ill health compromises opportunity 
and well-being, so does poverty induced by ill health and 
attempts to address it. Sometimes, as well, reducing the unfair 
distribution of health in a population—that is, improving 
health equity—should be given priority over making a health 
system more efficient (eg, by pursuing what is most cost-
effective to maximize health). Should HTA evaluate these 
issues as well as safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness?
Expanding the scope of HTA in these ways has a clear risk: 
HTA may be seen as overreaching its area of competency. 
For example, while the cost-effectiveness ratio of particular 
interventions (or the budget impact on society of covering 
them) can be evaluated quantitatively, a recommendation 
about which interventions are too costly to be covered may 
rest on non-quantified judgments about what it is more or 
less important to fund. Such issues may be thought beyond 
the scope of quantifiable methods. Yet, if HTA refrains from 
expanding its evaluation and recommendations to other 
issues, it may be judged irrelevant to the real needs of decision-
makers. Which risk is worse—overreaching or irrelevancy?
Our view is that the risk of irrelevancy is worse. Decision-
makers should make judgments that go beyond safety, 
efficacy, and cost-effectiveness, so an assessment limited 
to these features must of necessity be insufficient to yield a 
decision. This lack of sufficiency will support the ultimate 
charge of irrelevancy, if only because it is inadequate to ground 
the judgments that must be made. The fact of insufficiency 
is not debatable, whereas the claim of “overreaching” is. 
In addition, the risk of overreaching can be significantly 
reduced by embedding HTA in a fair, deliberative process, 
whereas the claim of insufficiency cannot. In Daniels and 
Sabin,6 the conditions that such a fair process must meet 
are called “accountability for reasonableness” (A4R). If 
HTA is embedded in a process that meets the conditions of 
A4R—publicity (decisions are fully transparent), relevancy 
(decisions are based on rationales that appeal to reasons 
all think are relevant to resource allocation, and, at least in 
publically administered systems, all appropriate stakeholders 
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vet the rationales), revisability (decisions can be revised 
in light of new evidence or arguments), and enforceability 
(decisions are all made in keeping with these conditions)—
then the increased legitimacy and fairness of the decisions 
will reduce the charges that HTA is overreaching. These 
conditions may seem less controversial than they are in 
practice, since everyone applauds transparency (publicity) 
until his or her practices are exposed by it. Improvements in 
transparency encounter much political foot-dragging in HTA 
and in decision-making in general.
Recently, World Health Organization (WHO) released ethical 
guidance about how fairness can be assured in the pursuit 
of universal coverage.7 It recommended that, as decision-
makers expand a benefit package—whether to cover more 
people, to cover more interventions, or to reduce co-pays and 
fees—cost-effectiveness gives important guidance. Decision-
makers ought to know how much health benefit a population 
receives for the resources they have to invest in health. But, 
as the report suggested, appeals to cost-effectiveness must 
also be tempered by judgments of fairness made as the 
result of a deliberative process that assures accountability for 
reasonableness. This recommendation provides a model for 
how we should think about HTA. If HTA is embedded in a 
fair, deliberative process that meets the conditions involved in 
A4R, its recommendations about equity and other aspects of 
fairness would similarly face a reduced risk of encountering 
the charge of “overreaching.”
Does A4R enhance only legitimacy, failing to assure the 
fairness of decisions? Or does A4R enhance both legitimacy 
and fairness? This is an important question since many 
think that a fair process can only improve legitimacy, not 
fairness (D. Brock, oral communicaton, February 2013). The 
judgment that fairness is also enhanced rests on this point: If 
we lack prior agreement on a substantive principle for making 
a particular decision, we may agree on a fair process for 
making it and we may then accept the outcome of that process 
(viewed as a form of procedural justice) as determining what 
is fair. That is what happens when we accept the toss of a coin 
to determine who goes first in a game or the toss of dice or the 
spin of a wheel to allocate winnings in a gamble.
Suppose, however, we can agree over time (it might take 
a long time—more than decision-makers have to arrive at 
a persuasive and acceptable argument) that a particular 
principle should determine how much priority to give to those 
who are worse off than others, or how to make other similarly 
difficult judgments. Then we might view the outcome of a 
process that yielded a different result as “wrong” or “unfair,” 
leading us to reject the view that we can accept the outcome 
of a fair process and regard it as fair. We claim that what we 
should then say is that the argument for the principle we come 
to accept “defeats” the appeal to the process. The support for 
this claim is that we often do not need a process if we have a 
substantive principle instead. (We may sometimes still need 
a fair process if we cannot apply the principle without one, 
as in a criminal trial where the principle we all agree to is 
“Convict all and only the guilty.” In this case, we still need a 
fair process to decide whether a particular defendant is guilty 
and should thus be convicted). But even if we allow for the 
possibility of such an argument for a principle in the case 
of resource allocation cases and then conclude that such an 
argument defeats the fairness of the process, we should accept 
the outcome of the fair process as fair until we actually find 
and accept a principle that defeats it. The mere possibility that 
such a principle, if it is accepted, can defeat the fairness of the 
process shows there is a difference between a gamble and a 
decision about resource allocation. But it does not show that 
the outcome of a fair process is not plausibly viewed as fair 
until it actually meets with that kind of defeat.
In any case, there is no challenge to the enhancement of 
legitimacy that embedding HTA in a fair, deliberative process 
can bring. How much enhancement conformance with the 
conditions involved in A4R brings is, however, an empirical 
question (and not a trivial one). Arguably, the conditions 
of publicity, relevance, revisability, and enforcement are 
theoretically justified, not empirically derived. But it 
should be possible to measure the effects on legitimacy of 
conformance with the conditions described in A4R for HTA. 
If an expanded version of HTA is embedded in a fair process, 
we should be able to measure the effect of doing so on the 
legitimacy of HTA. One of us (ND) was once asked by a group 
of Chinese health ministers if A4R “works.” They were asking 
“does it make decision-making better.” He could not give an 
evidence-based answer. Still, improving its legitimacy is one 
way to make decision-making about health care resource 
allocation better. 
A key aspect of its legitimacy is whether the process in 
which HTA is embedded establishes its “independence” to 
make judgments about the merits and weaknesses of various 
interventions. Some skepticism about the legitimacy of 
coverage decisions in some societies derives from the belief 
that HTA is in the service of vested interests that control the 
health system. This skepticism may be deepened if the process 
in which HTA is embedded yields only “recommendations” 
and not decisions. Indeed, in many countries, the most 
“independence” we can expect would still leave decision-
makers actually responding only to “recommendations” 
coming from an expanded HTA process, not surrendering 
to that process the power to make actual decisions. To hold 
decision-makers accountable for their decisions nevertheless, 
we should require them (by law or custom) to state why they 
are not following a recommendation if they reject it. Then 
democratic forces—to the extent that they exist—can compare 
their reasoning about their decision with the reasoning 
involved in the recommendation (which, by the requirements 
of A4R, is public) and act accordingly. 
Here we can only note that the independence of the HTA 
process is assured by the terms of appointment of, and 
the charge to, participants in the process leading to the 
recommendations that HTA makes. The tenure of the 
decision-makers and the people who appointed them, or 
of the elected officials responsible for appointing them, is 
determined by the degree of accountability the political 
process imposes on them. The independence of the HTA 
process can also be strengthened if other democratic 
institutions can help protect it from capture by vested interests. 
For example, in countries that recognize a legal right to health 
or health care and where the courts have become an important 
institutional actor in the political process surrounding these 
issues (as in many low- and middle-income countries) the 
courts can play an important role critically reviewing the 
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fairness of the HTA process and examining whether the 
reasons for policy decisions are fair and consistently applied. 
This can enhance the accountability of the HTA process; 
however, the courts can have the opposite effect given that 
they are also subject to capture by vested interests.8 Once 
again, the independence of the courts (and thus their ability 
to enhance the legitimacy of the HTA process) depends on 
the degree of accountability that the political process imposes 
on them. Ultimately, no process is safe from abuse—and the 
remedy for such abuse is always political.
In sum, HTA should (and increasingly does) make 
recommendations about technologies that go beyond 
their safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. These 
recommendations should be based on good evidence and 
arguments about all aspects of the rationales for them. These 
recommendations derive their legitimacy from the fair, 
deliberative process in which HTA is embedded. Nations 
must strive to make that process “independent” from vested 
interests, which is a tall order given the power of those interests 
and the complexity of managing a process that includes 
stakeholders. We can measure the effect on the legitimacy 
of HTA recommendations that emerge from such a process. 
Given the social disagreement that pervades many resource 
allocation decisions, it is harder to agree on the fairness of 
such recommendations, but there is considerable plausibility 
to accepting the outcomes of a fair process as fair. 
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